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DiDonato v. Wortman and Wrongful Death of a Viable Fetus
in North Carolina: The Case Against Unreasonably
Restricting Damages
Medical technology in this century has advanced at a breathtakingly rapid
rate, as yesterday's unattainable goals are quickly transformed into today's basic
medical knowledge. The law, accustomed to a more cautious rate of progress,
has frequently found itself struggling to integrate new medical discoveries into a
common law developed through years of carefully-reasoned growth. Particu-
larly noteworthy medical progress has been made in the area of prenatal devel-
opment. 1 Judicial recognition of fetal rights has proceeded somewhat more
deliberately, but in North Carolina fetuses have been accorded a right of inheri-
tance,2 and a child born alive can recover for prenatal injuries suffered as a result
of another's negligent behavior.3
The North Carolina Supreme Court's recent decision in DiDonato v. Wort-
man4 marked another legal milestone in establishing the rights of the unborn
and their parents. The DiDonato court held that a viable fetus is a "person"
under the North Carolina Wrongful Death Act and therefore the estate of a
stillborn child may bring a cause of action under this Act. 5 Although this deci-
sion adds North Carolina to the list of over thirty states that allow the estate of a
stillborn child to bring some type of wrongful death action, 6 the court limits
1. See J. ROSENBLITH & J. SiMs-KNIGHT, IN THE BEGINNING: DEVELOPMENT IN THE
FIRST Two YEARS OF LIFE 31-42 (1985). Obstetricians can now pinpoint a specific weekly timeta-
ble for fetal development. Between the eighth and twelfth weeks, for example, the fetus first begins
to move its arms and legs, begins to show different facial expressions, develops external sexual or-
gans, and has identifiable finger, palm, and toe prints. Id. at 31. By the 28th week, the fetus' lungs
have developed to the point where it is capable of surviving on its own outside the mother. Id. at 32;
see also T. VERNY & J. KELLY, THE SECRET LIFE OF THE UNBORN CHILD 15-52 (1981) (the start
of fetal awareness occurs between the twenty-eighth and thirty-second weeks at which time the neu-
ral circuits in a fetus' brain are just as advanced as in the brain of a newborn and the cerebral cortex,
the most complex part of the brain, is also advanced enough to support consciousness).
2. See Byerly v. Tolbert, 250 N.C. 27, 30-31, 108 S.E.2d 29, 32 (1959) (afterborn child of
decedent entitled to intestate share of estate); Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 159, 56 S.E. 691, 692
(1907) ("The statute law of this state [pertaining to intestate succession] treats the unborn child in its
mother's womb with the same consideration as if born."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-9 (1984).
3. See Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 155-56, 161 S.E.2d 531, 533-34 (1968); PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 367-70 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984). North Carolina
has yet to recognize a cause of action for wrongful life or wrongful birth. A wrongful life claim is
brought by a defective child who alleges that the negligent treatment or advice given the child's
parents caused the child to be born. A wrongful birth claim is brought by parents of a defective
child and alleges that the negligent treatment or advice provided the parents deprived them of the
opportunity to prevent the child's birth. See Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528
(1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 131 (1986). The North Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that life
itself, even life with defects, does not constitute an injury. Id. at 111, 337 S.E.2d at 533-34. How-
ever, parents may bring an action for "wrongful conception" if a physician's negligence results in an
unintended pregnancy. See Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 178-82, 347 S.E.2d 743, 748-49
(1986) (physician negligently fails to replace plaintiff's intrauterine device following surgery).
4. 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987).
5. North Carolina's Wrongful Death Act is codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984).
6. See Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Summerfield v.
Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224
A.2d 406 (1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Greater
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recovery to those damages the court views as clearly provable without resort to
speculation.
This Note examines the DiDonato decision in light of the history of wrong-
ful death actions brought on behalf of the unborn in North Carolina and in other
jurisdictions. It also traces the evolution of North Carolina's wrongful death
statute and the gradual expansion of recoverable damages resulting from judicial
interpretation of the statute in light of changing perceptions of human value.
This Note concludes that while the viable fetus should be entitled to the protec-
tion of North Carolina's wrongful death statute, the remedial purpose of the
statute can better be served by permitting the recovery of additional damages,
without basing these damages on pure speculation.
Norma DiDonato consulted defendant Dr. William J. Wortman on March
24, 1982 and was told by him she was pregnant.7 On a subsequent visit Wort-
man evaluated Mrs. DiDonato's pregnancy as one entailing "no risk." 8 Mrs.
DiDonato visited the offices of Wortman and codefendant John T. Hart fre-
quently, and starting in late June 1982, chemical tests began revealing the pres-
ence of sugar in Mrs. DiDonato's urine.9 Defendants never informed Mrs.
DiDonato of this finding or prescribed any medication to reduce the sugar
level.10 On October 26, a non-stress test disclosed that Mrs. DiDonato was car-
rying a viable healthy baby11 who could have been born alive had labor been
Southeast Comm. Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394 (D.C. App. 1984); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga.
App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982); Chrisafoge-
orgis v. Brandenburg, 55 I11. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277
N.E.2d 20 (1971); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d
901 (Ky. 1955); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981); State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234
Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916
(1975); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn.
365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainy v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); O'Grady v. Brown,
654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Poliquin v. MacDon-
ald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M 150, 619 P.2d 826,
modified on other grounds, 95 N.M. 147, 619 P.2d 823 (1980); Hopkins v. MdBane, 359 N.W.2d 862
(N.D. 1984); Werling v. Sandy, 17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d
924 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974); Amadio v. Levin,
509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976);
Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Farley v. Mt. Marty Hosp. Ass'n, 387
N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 1986); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980);
Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184
S.E.2d 428 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (1980). In addition, Iowa provides for recovery
under a rule of civil procedure allowing parents to recover for the death of a minor child. See Dunn
v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1983).
States that do not allow a cause of action are California, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, and Virginia. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977);
Stem v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977);
Grafv. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y,2d 478, 248 N.E.2d
901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
7. See Plantiff-Appellant's Brief at 3, DiDonato (No. 280A86). An initial due date of October
10, 1982, was set.
8. Id. This evaluation was made despite a family history of diabetes mellitus, a history of
infertility, and Mrs. DiDonato's age at the time of the pregnancy, 36 years.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 4. Defendants also failed to tell Mrs. DiDonato that her due date had been
revised from October 10 to later in the month. Id. at 3-4.
11. Viability is that "stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be con-
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induced. 12 Nevertheless, doctors could detect no fetal heartbeat when Mrs.
DiDonato was admitted four days later, and she gave birth to a stillborn baby by
cesarean section.1 3
Plaintiff Anthony DiDonato, the father of the decedent child and adminis-
trator of its estate, brought suit in Mecklenburg County Superior Court under
N.C. General Statutes section 28A-18-2, North Carolina's wrongful death stat-
ute.14 Plaintiff alleged at trial that Mrs. DiDonato had suffered from mild dia-
betes mellitus during her pregnancy, causing blood sugar to be "spilled" into her
urine. 15 Plaintiff further alleged that this "spill" resulted in the greater-than-
normal weight of the fetus, which in turn placed a strain on Mrs. DiDonato's
vascular system and caused the fetus to outgrow the placenta and its blood and
oxygen supply.16 Plaintiff claims defendants Wortman and Hart were negligent
in failing to inform Mrs. DiDonato of the potential danger her diabetes posed to
her pregnancy and in failing to monitor properly the effects of the diabetes on
her developing child or take corrective action before the life of the fetus was put
at risk.' 7
The trial court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff's action
for failure to state an actionable claim. 1 8 The North Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision, holding that a viable child en ventre sa mere' 9 who dies as
a result of a third party's negligence is not a "person" within the meaning of the
North Carolina Wrongful Death Act.20 According to the court of appeals, any
action to bring an unborn fetus within the protection of the Wrongful Death Act
should originate in the General Assembly rather than in the courts. 21
tinued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1404 (5th ed. 1979).
12. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 4.
13. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 424, 358 S.E.2d at 489. The weight of the male fetus removed from
Mrs. DiDonato's womb was 12 pounds, 11 ounces. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 4.
14. For the statutory language, see infra note 24.
15. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 4-5.
16. Id. at 4-6.
17. Id. at 5-6.
18. DiDonato v. Wortman, 80 N.C. App. 117, 118, 341 S.E.2d 58, 59 (1986), rev'd, 320 N.C.
423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987).
19. En ventre so mere means "in its mother's womb." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 479 (5th ed.
1979).
20. DiDonato, 80 N.C. App. at 118-19, 341 S.E.2d at 59-60.
21. Id. at 119, 341 S.E.2d at 60. In a dissenting opinion Judge Phillips asserted that the 1969
amendments to the wrongful death statute had brought the viable fetus within the statute's purview
by providing that pecuniary losses are not the sole damages recoverable in the event of a wrongful
death. Id. at 121, 341 S.E.2d at 61 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips viewed the majority's
restrictive definition of "person" requiring a live birth as being contrary to both legislative intent and
common perceptions of the meaning of the word.
A "person," according to the common understanding of mankind if the dictionaries they
use are any guide, is simply a human being. Nothing in the Wrongful Death Act or its
history suggests that the word meant anything else to the General Assembly, but much
indicates that it did not.... A viable, healthy 12-pound boy at term immediately before
birth is certainly a human being and plaintiff's action is authorized in my opinion under
both the language and spirit of the act.
Id. at 120, 341 S.E.2d at 60 (Phillips, J., dissenting). See contra Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App.
390, 393, 213 S.E.2d 382, 384 ("[W]e construe the word 'person' in our wrongful death statute to
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In its analysis of the case the North Carolina Supreme Court22 warned,
against "inferring legislative approval of appellate court decisions [holding that a
viable fetus is not a person for purposes of the wrongful death statute] from what
is really legislative silence." 23  The court focused its attention on the wrongful
death statute itself, the public policies surrounding its adoption, and the com-
mon law principles governing its application. 24
Specifically, the court interpreted the 1969 amendments to the Wrongful
Death Act25 to expand the class of plaintiffs entitled to bring causes of action by
widening the spectrum of recoverable damages to encompass damages other
than pecuniary loss. 2 6 By analogizing to a child's right to recover for prenatal
injuries established in Stetson v. Easterling,2 7 and by studying other jurisdictions'
treatment of comparable wrongful death statutes, the court reasoned that a via-
mean one who has become recognized as a person by having been born alive."), cert. denied, 287
N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975).
22. Plaintiff had an appeal of right to the supreme court by virtue of Judge Phillips' dissent in
the court of appeals' opinion. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2) (1986).
23. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 425, 358 S.E.2d at 490. The decisions denying an action for the
wrongful death of a stillborn child under the current statute are Yow v. Nance, 29 N.C. App. 419,
224 S.E.2d 292, disc rev. denied, 290 N.C. 312, 225 S.E.2d 833 (1976), and Cardwell v. Welch, 25
N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975).
24. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 425, 358 S.E.2d at 490. North Carolina's wrongful death statute
reads in part:
(a) When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default of another,
such as would, if the injured person had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages
therefor, the person or corporation that would have been so liable, and his or their personal
representatives or collectors, shall be liable to an action for damages, to be brought by the
personal representative or collector of the decedent ....
(b) Damages recoverable for death by wrongful act include:
(1) Expenses for care, treatment and hospitalization incident to the injury resulting
in death;
(2) Compensation for pain and suffering of the decedent;
(3) The reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent;
(4) The present monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the
damages recovered, including but not limited to compensation for the loss of the reason-
ably expected:
a. Net income of the decedent,
b. Services, protection, care and assistance of the decedent, whether voluntary or
obligatory, to the persons entitled to the damages recovered,
c. Society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of the de-
cedent to the persons entitled to the damages recovered;
(5) Such punitive damages as the decedent could have recovered had he survived,
and punitive damages for wrongfully causing the death of the decedent through malicious-
ness, willful or wanton injury, or gross negligence;
(6) Nominal damages when the jury so finds.
(c) All evidence which reasonably tends to establish any of the elements of damages in-
cluded in subsection (b), or otherwise reasonably tends to establish the present monetary
value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered, is admissible
in an action for damages for death by wrongful act.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 53-62.
26. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 429-30, 358 S.E.2d at 492-93.
27. 274 N.C. 152, 156, 161 S.E.2d 531, 534 (1968) (a living child can maintain a cause of action
to recover damages for injuries negligently inflicted upon it while it was still in its mother's womb);
see also Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 399, 146 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1966) ("Since the child must
carry the burden of infirmity that results from another's tortious act, it is only natural justice that it,
if born alive, be allowed to maintain an action on the ground of actionable negligence.").
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ble fetus is a living being capable of independent life and worthy of protection
under the Wrongful Death Act.28 In summarizing the rationale behind its deci-
sion, the court stated,
The language of our wrongful death statute, its legislative history, and
recognition of the statute's broadly remedial objectives compel us to
conclude that any uncertainty in the meaning of the word "person"
should be resolved in favor of permitting an action to recover for the
destruction of a viable fetus en ventre sa mere.29
The court next considered what damages would be available to the estate of
a stillborn child in a wrongful death action.30 In determining the recoverable
damages, the court was bound by the requirement that any damages must be
based on solid proof of loss and not on unreasonable speculation alone.31 While
recognizing "that the damages in any wrongful death action are to some extent
uncertain and speculative,"'3 2 the court stated that the difficulty in calculating
damages is particularly acute in actions based on the death of an unborn child
because no characteristics of the child's personality, intelligence, or work capa-
bilities can be known.33
Consequently, the court held that the beneficiaries of a stillborn child's es-
tate cannot recover damages for lost income or for loss of services, assistance,
society, companionship, and the like, because all would require excessive specu-
lation in the absence of knowledge about the child's relevant personal quali-
ties.3 4 Unless fetal pain and suffering can be proved to a court's satisfaction, the
possibility of which the court doubted but would not foreclose, the estate is enti-
tled to recover only medical and funeral expenses and any punitive or nominal
damages capable of proof."
28. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 426-28, 358 S.E.2d at 491-92. Referring to a living child's ability to
recover for negligently inflicted prenatal injuries, the court stated, "It would be logical and consis-
tent [with Stetson v. Easterling and similar decisions in other jurisdictions], and would further the
policy of deterring dangerous conduct that underlies them, to allow such claims when the fetus does
not survive." Id. at 427, 358 S.E.2d at 491.
29. Id. at 430, 358 S.E.2d at 493.
30. Id. at 430-32, 358 S.E.2d at 493-94.
31. See Norwood v. Carter, 242 N.C. 152, 156, 87 S.E.2d 2, 5 (1955); Newbold v. Meadows
Fertilizer Co., 199 N.C. 552, 552, 155 S.E. 244, 244 (1930).
32. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 431, 358 S.E.2d at 494 (quoting Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 310,
204 A.2d 140, 144 (1964)). The Grafcourt distinguished prenatal wrongful death cases from other
wrongful death actions by virtue of the uniformly speculative nature of the proof of loss of pecuniary
benefits in prenatal cases. Graf, 43 N.J. at 310-11, 204 A.2d at 144-45.
33. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 431-32, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
34. Id. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494. According to this interepretation of the statute, the estate is
precluded from recovering any damages for the decedent's present monetary value listed in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(4). For the text of the statute, see supra note 24.
35. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494. Any medical expenses associated with the
birth process could be recovered by either the estate in its wrongful death action or by the mother in
a separate personal injury action. Punitive damages would also potentially be available in both ac-
tions, although defendants allegedly committed only one tortious act. Id. at 432-34, 358 S.E.2d at
494-95. Fearing such a double recovery of some elements of damages, the court held that any
wrongful death action brought by the estate must be joined with any personal injury claims brought
by the parents in connection with the same negligent behavior that gives rise to the wrongful death
action. Id. The court compared DiDonato to Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., 300
N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980), in which the court established a spouse's right to maintain an
action for loss of consortium, but required joinder of any such claim with any personal injury action
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In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part joined by Justice
Mitchell, Justice Martin agreed that the 1969 amendments to the wrongful
death statute signified the General Assembly's intent to broaden the range of
compensable deaths to include those that may not give rise to easily calculable
pecuniary damages.3 6 Because a viable unborn child has been held to have "a
life capable of being destroyed" for purposes of the criminal law,37 Justice Mar-
tin reasoned that a similar result should be reached when the court applies a
lesser civil standard, such as in a wrongful death action.38 Unlike the majority,
however, Justice Martin would initially afford the plaintiff in a prenatal wrong-
ful death action the opportunity to recover all statutory damages, limited not by
the supreme court's direction but rather by the trial court's discretion.39 In a
separate dissenting opinion, Justice Webb argued that any expansion of the
wrongful death statute should come through legislative rather than judicial ac-
tion.4° Justice Webb also questioned the majority's artificial limitation on dam-
ages for the cause of action created. 41
The history of wrongful death recovery in North Carolina and the statutory
predecessors to the current Wrongful Death Act give insight to the limitation on
damages imposed in DiDonato. The earliest formulation of North Carolina's
Wrongful Death Act, enacted in 1855, emphasized the purely financial basis of
the tort, providing for recovery of damages only in terms of pecuniary injury.42
brought by the other spouse in order to avoid double recovery. According to the Nicholson court,
the real injury precipitating both actions was to the family relationship as an entity, and, therefore,
only a single recovery should be allowed for any elements of damages duplicated in the two causes of
action, including punitive damages. Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 303-04, 266 S.E.2d at 822-23.
36. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 435-37, 358 S.E.2d at 495-97 (Martin & Mitchell, J.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
37. State v. Forte, 222 N.C. 537, 538, 23 S.E.2d 842, 843 (1943). In Forte the supreme court
held that, for purposes of determining when a doctor may legally perform an abortion, a child does
not acquire a legal existence separate from that of its mother until the mother is"quick with child,"
or feels the child move within her. Id. at 538-39, 23 S.E.2d at 843-44.
38. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 435-36, 358 S.E.2d at 496 (Martin & Mitchell, J.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
39. Id. at 436, 358 S.E.2d at 497 (Martin & Mitchell, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
The legislature has defined the possible elements of damage recoverable in a wrongful
death action and must have intended that the same rule of damages apply to all such
actions. It is not the perogative of this Court to usurp a legislative function by rewriting
the statute to change the rule of damages.
Id. at 436-37, 358 S.E.2d at 496-97. Justice Martin would also leave the matter ofjoinder of separate
wrongful death and personal injuries actions to the discretion of the trial judge. .d. at 437, 358
S.E.2d at 497. Martin stated,
There are many factors to be considered in deciding this question [ofjoinder], such as the
identity of parties and the negligent act or acts involved. Defenses available to defendant
or defendants as to each plaintiff, time constraints within which to institute the different
actions, the measurement of damages, and other factors, may vary. Protecting a defendant
from paying double punitive damages on the same evidence can be accomplished on a case-
by-case basis.
Id.,
40. Id. at 437-38, 358 S.E.2d at 497 (Webb, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 438, 358 S.E.2d at 497 (Webb, J., dissenting).
42. The 1855 statute read:
sec. 2 Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act of another
person, and the wrongful act is such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain
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Statutory language pertaining to damages remained unchanged in North Caro-
lina until 1969, and judges interpreted this language to preclude any plaintiff
who could not demonstrate pecuniary loss from maintaining a cause of action.4 3
Thus, representatives of persons who were not regular wage-earners, such as
very young children,44 homemakers,4 5 the mentally-handicapped 4 and elderly
persons 47 were effectively barred from bringing wrongful death actions, because
the death of their decedents gave rise to no demonstrable lost income.
48
This interpretation of the wrongful death statute, making definite pecuniary
loss a prerequisite for recovery, provided the primary justification for denying a
cause of action to the estate of a stillborn child. 49 Thus, in the 1966 case Gay v.
Thompson 50 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a wrongful death ac-
tion brought by a stillborn's estate was barred "on the ground there can be no
evidence from which to infer 'pecuniary injury resulting from' the wrongful pre-
an action, and recover damages in respect thereof, if death had not ensued, then and in
every such case, the person who would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be
liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and
although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to
felony.
sec. 3 Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal representa-
tive of the deceased .... and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they
shall deem fair and just, with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death.
Act of Feb. 16, 1855, Ch. 39, §§ 2-3, 1854 N.C. Public Laws, 97, 97-98 (codified in REVISED CODE
OF 1854, ch. 1, § 9-10).
The tort continued to be based on the English premise that children helped support the family
through work outside the home and that the death of a child could mean financial calamity for the
family. For a discussion of the history of the pecuniary loss rule, see Note, The Pecuniary Loss Rule
as an Inappropriate Measure of Damages in Child Death Cases, 18 IND. L. Rv. 731 (1985).
43. See Scriven v. McDonald, 264 N.C. 727, 732, 142 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1965); Bryant v. Wood-
lief, 252 N.C. 488, 494-95, 114 S.E.2d 241, 246 (1960); Collier v. Arrington, 61 N.C. 356, 358 (1867).
In Scriven the court reversed a judgment for $5750 awarded to the estate of an eleven-year-old
mentally-handicapped boy stating, "The statute, G.S. 28-174, leaves no room for sentiment. It con-
fers a right to compensation only for pecuniary loss." Scriven, 264 N.C. at 732, 142 S.E.2d at 588.
44. See Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968) (sustaining a demurrer to
estate's cause of action on behalf of a child who died from prenatal brain injuries after living only a
few months on ground that calculating pecuniary damages would amount to sheer speculation).
45. See Lamm v. Lorbacher, 235 N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952).
The view that the value of decedent's labor in the home as a housewife should be consid-
ered by the jury in determining the amount of damages recoverable is supported by reputa-
ble authority in some other jurisdictions, but under the North Carolina Statute as
interpreted by the decisions of this Court compensation for wrongful death is limited to
'the pecuniary injury resulting from such death.'
Id. at 731, 71 S.E.2d at 52 (citation omitted) (quoting N.C GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (1950)).
46. See Scriven, 264 N.C. 727, 142 S.E.2d 585 (denying recovery to the estate of a mentally-
handicapped child based upon evidence tending to show the deceased would have contined to be
dependent on others for his care and would never have been able to earn a livelihood).
47. See Armentrout v. Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E.2d 793 (1958) (affirming jury award of
no damages to estate of an 80-year-old woman without apparent earning capacity).
48. See DiDonato, 80 N.C. App. at 120-21, 341 S.E.2d at 60-61 (1986) (Phillips, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987); Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental Co., 283 N.C. 395,
418-19, 196 S.E.2d 789, 805 (1973).
49. See Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
50. 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966). Gay was a case of first impression. The issue before
the court was whether the administrator of the estate of a stillborn child who died as a result of
injuries negligently inflicted while he was a viable fetus can maintain a cause of action under North
Carolina's Wrongful Death Act. Id. at 395, 146 S.E.2d at 426.
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natal death of a viable child en ventre sa mere; it is all sheer speculation." 5 1
Despife plaintiff's allegations that the doctor's negligence had resulted in the
stillbirth of the Gays' child, the court held that "[n]egligence alone, without
.'pecuniary injury resulting from such death,' does not create a cause of
action.",5 2
Sensing the unjust results produced by requiring pecuniary loss as the ex-
clusive basis for a wrongful death action, in 1969 the North Carolina General
Assembly amended the wrongful death statute with the so-called "Wife's
Bill."' 53 The General Assembly stated its purpose in expanding the damages
recoverable in a wrongful death action in the preamble to the amendments,
which reads:
WHEREAS, human life is inherently valuable; and WHEREAS, the
present statute is so written and construed that damages recoverable
from a person who has caused death by a wrongful act are effectively
limited to such figure as can be calculated from the expected earnings
of the deceased, which is far from an adequate measure of the value of
human life .... 54
The amendments, which changed the wording of the statute to the current statu-
tory language of the Wrongful Death Act,55 allow a plaintiff to recover the med-
ical and funeral expenses of the decedent, compensation for the decedent's pain
and suffering, applicable punitive or nominal damages, and the present monetary
value of the decedent, measured in terms of the loss of decedent's services, care,
assistance, society, companionship, guidance, and net income.5 6 In addition, all
evidence reasonably tending to establish any of these elements of damages or the
decedent's present monetary value is admissible for that purpose.,57
While these changes in the Wrongful Death Act removed the pecuniary loss
51. Id. at 402, 146 S.E.2d at 431. In Gay the defendant doctor administered labor-inducing
drugs to Barbara Gay despite the apparent good health of both Mrs. Gay and her unborn child. The
drugs were unsuccessful and Mrs. Gay returned to her home, only to come back to the hospital the
next day suffering from an acute infection of the uterus that resulted in the deaths of both Mrs. Gay
and the child. Id. at 394-95, 146 S.E.2d at 425-26.
52. Id. at 398, 146 S.E.2d at 428 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (1966)). Section 28-174
restricted recovery to "a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting from such
death." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (1966).
53. Act of April 14, 1969, ch. 215, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 194, 194 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 28-174 (1971)). The nickname "Wife's Bill" stems from the fact the amendments enabled
the estates of homemakers to recover damages in wrongful death actions for the first time. Because
these women earned no outside income for performing their household chores, the courts had previ-
ously viewed their deaths as causing no pecuniary loss. See generally Lamm v. Lorbacher, 235 N.C.
728, 731, 71 S.E.2d 49, 52 (1952) (holding that decedent's labor as a housewife is not to be consid-
ered in calculating pecuniary loss resulting from her death); Note, The New North Carolina Wrong-
ful Death Statute, 48 N.C.L. REv. 594, 598 (1970) (suggesting that the amendments will force juries
to consider the loss sustained by beneficiaries in all respects, not just in pecuniary terms).
54. Act of April 14, 1969, ch. 215, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 194, 194.
55. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (1984). For the relevant statutory language, see supra
note 24.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984). For examples of cases in which courts have upheld
increased damage awards or instructed juries to consider awarding increased damages in accordance
with the statutory directive, see Carver v. Carver, 310 N.C. 669, 683, 314 S.E.2d 739, 747-48 (1984);
Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental Co., 283 N.C. 395, 419, 196 S.E.2d 789, 805 (1973).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(c) (1984).
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requirement as a major barrier that prevented wrongful death claims from being
brought on behalf of stillborn children, North Carolina courts were reluctant to
designate a viable fetus a "person"' and allow its estate to maintain a cause of
action.58 In Cardwell v. Welch, 59 and later in Yow v. Nance,6° the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals found it probable that by using the word "person" in the
wrongful death statute, the legislature "intended to create a cause of action only
for the wrongful death of one who by live birth had attained a recognized indi-
vidual identity so as to have become a 'person' as that word is commonly under-
stood." 61 The court also reasoned that a live birth furnished an easily
recognizable starting point from which to measure life for wrongful death pur-
poses, as opposed to establishing a viability standard which would only lend
itself to further argument and confusion.62
North Carolina's hesitation to extend wrongful death protection to a viable
fetus, however, was the exception rather that the rule among its sister states.
Beginning with the groundbreaking 1949 Minnesota case Verkennes v.
Corniea,63 by 1986 thirty-five jurisdictions had afforded estates of viable fetuses
the opportunity to recover damages by way of wrongful death actions. 64 While
many of these decisions simply established the cause of action and remanded the
case to a lower court for the determination of damages, 65 thereby ignoring the
admitted difficulty in ascertaining which damages are recoverable, a few courts
58. See Yow v. Nance, 29 N.C. App. 419, 224 S.E.2d 292, disc. rev. denied, 290 N.C. 312, 225
S.E.2d 833 (1976); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464,
215 S.E.2d 623 (1975).
59. 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975).
60. 29 N.C. App. 419, 224 S.E.2d 292, disc rev. denied, 290 N.C. 312, 225 S.E.2d 833 (1976),
overruled by DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987).
61. Cardwell, 25 N.C. App. at 392, 213 S.E.2d at 383.
62. Id. at 392-93, 213 S.E.2d at 383-84.
63. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
64. See cases cited supra note 6. For additional justifications advanced by courts in establishing
wrongful death actions on behalf of viable fetuses, see Werling v. Sandy, 17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 48, 476
N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (1985) (failure to allow cause of action could lead to inconsistency if viable
unborn twins are injured simultaneously in the womb, one twin dying from the injury before birth
and one after birth); Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 205, 501 A.2d 1085, 1087-88 (1985) (recognizing
a wrongful death action on behalf of a child who has been born while denying one for a viable
unborn child encourages tortfeasors to behave more negligently so as to kill an unborn child and
thereby preclude a cause of action). Contra Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REv. 579,
594 (1965) ("[T]he grant of compensation ... to the parents of an infant in utero, is in reality
compensation for sentimental loss franed as though it were pecuniary loss."); Comment, Develop-
ments in the Law of Prenatal Wrongful Death, 69 DICK. L. REv. 258, 266-67 (1965) (calculating
damages in prenatal wrongful death cases amounts to sheer speculation, and death of a fetus rarely
represents a pecuniary loss to the parents).
Two states, Georgia and Rhode Island, allow a cause of action for fetuses killed before they
reach the point of viability. In Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 715-16, 87 S.E.2d 100, 102-03
(1955), the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that a fetus must be "quick," defined as "able to move
in its mother's womb," for the wrongful death statute to be applicable. The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island stated in Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 188, 365 A.2d 748, 754 (1976), that,
"[i]t seems that if live birth is to be characterized, as it so frequently has been, as an arbitrary line of
demarcation, then viability, when enlisted to serve that same purpose, is a veritable non sequitur."
See Note, Wrongful Death of the Fetus: Viability is Not a Viable Distinction, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 103 (1984).
65. See, e.g., O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Mone v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenburg, 55 Ill. 2d 368,
304 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
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have attempted to formulate workable solutions to the damages problem. Using
their respective state wrongful death statutes as a guide, some jurisdictions have
adopted the pre-1969 North Carolina view limiting recovery in viable fetus cases
to definite pecuniary losses.66 Others have declined to place such a limitation on
damages and have held that an estate is entitled to a wider range of compensa-
tion. 67 While the specificity with which the various elements of recoverable
damages are enumerated makes North Carolina's wrongful death statute some-
what unique, an examination of the damage provisions in wrongful death stat-
utes of other jurisdictions will prove helpful in determining whether the
limitation on damages imposed by the supreme court in DiDonato is reasonable.
In Illinois, which still requires damages to be based on the pecuniary injury
suffered by the estate, 68 the supreme court upheld an award of $125,000 to a
stillborn's estate based on a presumption of substantial pecuniary loss. 69 The
only evidence introduced in that case showed that the fetus appeared to be nor-
mal and healthy prior to the defendant's negligence.70 Similarly, the Michigan
Supreme Court stated in dicta in the 1971 case O'Neill v. Morse7 that Michi-
gan's wrongful death statute could be interpreted to permit the parents of a
deceased, previously viable fetus to recover damages for loss of their child's serv-
ices.72 At that time the statute provided for the recovery of damages based on
pecuniary injury, medical and funeral expenses, and compensation for pain and
suffering.73 While acknowledging these damages would be difficult to prove in
the case of an infant or stillborn child, the Michigan court stated that the par-
ents were entitled to such compensation if, as in the instant case, pecuniary inju-
ries were alleged.74
Minnesota is another jurisdiction in which courts have interpreted a statute
66. See, eg., Jones v. Karraker, 98 Ill. 2d 487, 457 N.E.2d 23 (1983); Pehrson v. Kistner, 301
Minn. 299, 222 N.W.2d 334 (1974); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971)
(dicta).
67. See, e.g., Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969); Rice v. RiAzk, 453
S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970).
68. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987). The statute reads in part,
"[T]he jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to
the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death .... ." Id.; see also id. ch. 70, § 2.2 (statute specify-
ing that the state of human gestation at death shall not preclude the maintenance of a wrongful
death action of behalf of decedent).
69. See Jones v. Karraker, 98 Ill. 2d 487, 457 N.E.2d 23 (1983).
70. Id. at 489-90, 457 N.E.2d at 24-25. "[I]n many opinions involving verdicts for the wrongful
death of minor children, the evidence of the child's health, abilities, disposition and other accom-
plishments has been discussed, but in none of these opinions was it held that such evidence is re-
quired to sustain a verdict." Id. at 491, 457 N.E.2d at 25.
71. 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971).
72. Id. at 139, 188 N.W.2d at 788; see also In re Olney's Estate, 309 Mich. 65, 84, 14 N.W.2d
574, 582 (1944) (establishing loss of decedent's services as part of pecuniary injury in wrongful death
action).
73. See Act of July 12, 1965, no. 146, 1965 Mich. Pub. Acts 232. 'The statute has since been
amended to replace its pecuniary loss basis with a broader spectrum of recoverable damages, includ-
ing the loss of society and companionship of the deceased. See Act of July 28, 1971, no. 65, 1971
Mich. Pub. Acts 111-12 (codified at MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2922(2) (Callaghan 1980)), as
amended by Act of July 10, 1985, no. 93, 1985 Mich. Pub. Acts 222-24 (codified at MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 27A.2922(6) (Callaghan Supp. 1987)).
74. O'Neill, 385 Mich. at 139, 188 N.W.2d at 788.
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having the estate's pecuniary loss as its touchstone to encompass a greater range
of damages than merely lost income.75 In Pehrson v. Kistner7 6 the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed a district court verdict awarding the estate of a viable
fetus only $540 on the ground that this amount was less than the $586 of special
damages proved by the plaintiff.7 7 In remanding the case for a new trial on the
issue of damages, the court stated, "[]t is difficult to visualize a case where a
human being does not have some monetary value in addition to special damages
incurred by next of kin.' ' Ts Among the jury's errors was the failure to consider
awarding damages for pecuniary loss, which in Minnesota includes, among
other things, compensation for lost counsel, guidance, aid, comfort, and assist-
ance.79 The court implied that while it realized trying to equate such intangible
qualities with a definite pecuniary sum could be a difficult task for juries, the
trial judge's right to overturn the verdict and the defendant's ability to appeal
would prevent juries from returning unreasonably inflated verdicts.80
The Kentucky wrongful death statute81 provides wrongful death plaintiffs
with both a general recovery of damages and an award of punitive damages if
the defendant's negligence was gross or wilful.82 The Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky, the highest court in Kentucky at the time, stated, "In few states is the
determination of damages left to the jury to the extent that it is in Kentucky."8 3
Kentucky case law interpreted the proper measure of damages in a wrongful
75. See Rath v. Hamilton Standard Div., 292 N.W.2d 282, 284-85 (Minn. 1980) ("The term
'pecuniary loss' is not limited strictly to loss of income."); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 352-54,
113 N.W.2d 355, 358-59 (1962) (expanding "pecuniary loss" to include loss of advice, comfort, and
assistance that the jury could determine to be of pecuniary value).
76. 301 Minn. 299, 222 N.W.2d 334 (1974).
77. Id. at 301, 222 N.W.2d at 335-36.
78. Id. at 303, 222 N.W.2d at 337.
79. See id. at 302-03, 222 N.W.2d at 336-37.
80. Id. at 303, 222 N.W.2d at 337. "[A]U verdicts attempting to compensate for the death of a
minor child may be arbitrary attempts at a difficult, if not impossible, task. This court has on nu-
merous occasions extended deference to amounts awarded by trial courts in this type of case." Id.;
see also Ahrenholz v. Hennepin County, 295 N.W.2d 645, 649-50 (Minn. 1980) (affirming verdict of
$100,000 in wrongful death of a one-month-old child and comparing relative sizes of verdicts re-
turned in child wrongful death cases in other jurisdictions). Although the infant in Ahrenholz had
been born alive, many if not all of the valuation problems inherent in a viable fetus case also arise
when a newborn infant dies because of another's negligent behavior. For example, evaluating the
decedent's character and personality in attempting to arrive at compensation for lost counsel and
comfort would be equally difficult in either case. In Ahrenholz the jury originally returned a judg-
ment for $428,000, but the trial judge viewed this sum as excessive and used his discretion to reduce
the verdict to $100,000, an amount upheld as reasonable by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Id. at
646-47. A similar reduction in the verdict could serve to protect the defendants in a viable fetus case
from an award of damages more akin to punishment than compensation for the tort committed,
while affording the jury the chance to return a verdict it views as fair under the circumstances.
81. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.130(1) (Michie Supp. 1986).
82. Id.
83. Wilkins v. Hopkins, 278 Ky. 280, 283, 128 S.W.2d 772, 774(1939). The District of Colum-
bia also gives a jury a wide amount of discretion in calculating damages, specifying only that they
must "be assessed with reference to the injury resulting from the act, neglect, or default causing the
death." D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2701 (1981). It is significant that the reference is simply to the
resulting injury and not the resulting pecuniary injury. In Crooks v. Williams, 508 A.2d 912, 915
(D.C. App. 1986), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, applying § 16-2701, upheld an
award of $370,000 in a case in which a viable fetus died as a result of an obstetrician's negligence. A
cause of action may also be maintained under D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-101 (1981), a "survival statute"
allowing the legal representative of a decedent to maintain a cause of action in place of the decedent.
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death action to be the "permanent reduction of the decedent's power to earn
money."84 Applying this rule in the context of a viable fetus case, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky held in Rice v. Rizk 85 that, "[t]he measure for damages in
a wrongful death action involving an infant [including a stillborn infant, such as
the decedent] is the destruction of the infant's power to earn money." 86
Notwithstanding the decedent's status as a stillborn child, the court held that
the jury erred by failing to follow the trial court's instructions to award damages
based on the "inference that the child would have had some earning power," and
ordered a new trial. 87
In a similar 1969 case interpreting West Virginia law, the United States
District Court for the Sourthern District of West Virginia held that in the ab-
sence of proof by plaintiff of specific pecuniary loss, West Virginia's wrongful
death statute provided for the recovery of a maximum of $10,000 for sorrow and
distress only.88 The court stated, "In awarding the initial $10,000.00, the jury
may properly consider as elements of damage the grief and mental distress of a
parent on account of loss of a child." 89 The court reasoned that in regard to
determining an appropriate award of damages for the sorrow and bereavement
resulting from a death, no real distinction could be drawn between the deaths of
a stillborn child and an adult.90 However, the court noted that a great disparity
in the difficulty of proof existed in regard to pecuniary loss, so as to prevent a
stillborn's estate from recovering more than the specified sum of $10,000, absent
"evidence from which the jury could rationalize and determine with reasonable
accuracy the probable quantum of such potential loss."91 West Virginia's cur-
rent wrongful death statute has abolished all statutory limits on recovery and is
similar to North Carolina's statute in that it allows a jury to award damages for
"[s]orrow, mental anguish, and solace which may include society, companion-
ship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of the decedent;... compensa-
84. See Wilkins, 278 Ky. at 285, 128 S.W.2d at 775.
85. 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970).
86. Id. at 735.
87. Id. at 735-36. The court added,
Lack of pro'of of the decedent [stillborn] infant Rice's power will not preclude recovery for
the wrongful, negligent destruction of the infant's power to earn money. To require such
proof would be to deny damages in the instant case, as well as in all similar wrongful,
negligent death cases involving infants.
Id. at 735. Interestingly, the court failed to address the applicability of a Kentucky statute awarding
the parents of deceased minors damages for "loss of affection and companionship that would have
been derived from such child during its minority .... " KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.135 (Michie
1970).
88. See Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220, 227 (S.D. W. Va. 1969). The wrongful
death statute in use at the time, read:
In every such action the jury may award such damages as they deem fair and just, not
exceeding ten thousand dollars .... In addition, the jury may award such further dam-
ages, not exceeding the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, as shall equal the financial or
pecuniary loss sustained by the dependent distributee or distributees of such deceased per-
son ....
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (1966).
89. Panagopoulous, 295 F. Supp. at 227.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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tion for reasonably expected loss of... services, protection, care and assistance
provided by the decedent" in addition to the traditional damages for lost income
and medical and funeral expenses. 92 No appellate case has interpreted the new
statute, however, and it does not give jurors any guidance as to how to calculate
definite dollar amounts as compensation for these elements of damages.
Given that all wrongful death damage awards rest on a somewhat specula-
tive basis, 93 the fear that a jury's decision on damages will be influenced by an
especially pitiable plaintiff is a legitimate concern in any wrongful death action.
This fear caused the majority in DiDonato to imply that awarding the estate of a
stillborn child any damages for the present monetary value of the decedent
would be to indulge sentiment and sympathy at the expense of legal certainty. 94
However, holdings in comparable areas of North Carolina law and in wrongful
death decisions of other jurisdictions suggest that a legally defensible award of
damages representing the fetus' monetary value can be calculated. The North
Carolina Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Moore95 that
The present monetary value of the decedent... will usually defy any
precise mathematical computation. Therefore, the assessment of dam-
ages must, to a large extent, be left to the good sense and fair judgment
of the jury-subject, of course, to the discretionary power of the judge
to set its verdict aside when, in his opinion, equity and justice so
require.96
Although it is well settled that a court will not award damages based on "sheer
speculation, devoid of factual substantiation, ' 97 it is equally true that the jury
should be allowed to hear any evidence tending to establish the decedent's pres-
ent monetary value.98 The trial judge is always available to overturn any verdict
lacking a sound factual basis 99 and to ensure that any damages awarded a still-
born's estate are reasonable and not based solely on emotional considerations. 10
North Carolina cases dealing with a spouse's loss of consortium exhibit
courts' increasing willingness and confidence to let juries assess damages having
92. W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (Supp. 1987). For the session law deleting the limit on recovery
from the statute, see 1976 W.Va. Acts 1-3.
93. See, e.g., Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 398, 146 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1966).
94. See DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 431-32, 358 S.E.2d at 493-94. "'[O]ur liberality in allowing
substantial damages where the proofs are relatively speculative should not preclude us from drawing
a line where the speculation becomes unreasonable.'" Id. at 431, 358 S.E.2d at 494 (quoting Graf v.
Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 310, 204 A.2d 140, 144 (1964)); see also Scriven v. McDonald, 264 N.C. 727,
732, 142 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1965) ("The statute... leaves no room for sentiment.").
95. 286 N.C. 664, 213 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
96. Id. at 673, 213 S.E.2d at 348-49 (citations omitted).
97. See Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 398, 146 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1966); see also Graf v.
Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (holding that a distinction should be drawn between
reasonable speculation common to every wrongful death action and excessive speculation required in
awarding any compensation to representatives of an unborn child).
98. See supra text accompanying note 57.
99. See, eg., Walston v. Greene, 246 N.C. 617, 617, 99 S.E.2d 805, 805-06 (1957).
100. Justices Martin and Mitchell echoed this sentiment in their DiDonato dissent, stating that
plaintiffs should be allowed to recover all damages proved to the satisfaction of the trial judge.
DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 436-37, 358 S.E.2d at 496-97. They believed it preferable to permit the trial
judge to bar damage recovery on a case-by-case basis rather than to automatically preclude the
recovery of an entire class of damages at the appellate level. Id. at 436, 358 S.E.2d at 496.
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a somewhat intangible basis. 101 In Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hos-
pital 10 2 the North Carolina Supreme Court re-established a spouse's right to
bring a loss of consortium action in this state, defining consortium as "service,
society, companionship, sexual gratification, and affection."' 1 3 With the excep-
tion of sexual gratification, these same elements are also components of a dece-
dent's monetary value in a wrongful death action. 1 4 More importantly, the
Nicholson court held that these damages are not too remote to serve as the basis
for a loss of consortium action.'0 5 An obvious difference exists between the two
causes of action, because the plaintiff in a loss of consortium suit can introduce
evidence of their loved one's prior conduct. But the estate of a stillborn child
can accomplish much the same purpose by introducing evidence of the unborn
child's health before death and the general family background, leaving it to the
jury to infer the extent of services and companionship the child would have
provided for its parents. 10 6
Similarly, a certain pecuniary sum cannot be attached to the pain and suf-
fering endured by a tort plaintiff without engaging in speculation. Yet in Dunlap
v. Lee 10 7 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that damages for pain and
suffering are recoverable despite their elusiveness and that in arriving at its
award a jury should consider "'what, under all the circumstances, should be
allowed the plaintiff in addition to the other items of damages to which he is
entitled, in reasonable consideration of the suffering necessarily endured.' "108
Such a consideration would seem equally appropriate in a prenatal wrongful
death case. Damages for the decedent's monetary value can only be denied in a
prenatal wrongful death action not because of doubt over whether a definite loss
worthy of compensation has occurred, but because of the intangible, emotional
nature of the injury suffered. It must be remembered, however, that "[t]he fact
that the full extent of the damages must be a matter of some speculation is no
ground for refusing all damages."' 0 9
101. See Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., 300 N.C. 295, 302, 266 S.E.2d 818, 822
(1980); Goble v. Helms, 64 N.C. App. 439, 451-52, 307 S.E.2d 807, 815-16 (1983), disc. rev. denied,
310 N.C. 625, 315 S.E.2d 690 (1984).
102. 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980).
103. Id. at 302, 266 S.E.2d at 822.
104. For a list of the elements of a decedent's monetary value, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2
(b)(4), supra note 24.
105. Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 302, 266 S.E.2d at 822.
106. See Jones v. Karraker, 98 II. 2d 487, 457 N.E.2d 23 (1983); Decof, Damages in Actions for
Wrongful Death of Children, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 197, 202 (1971) (list of elements to be
considered in arriving at the pecuniary value of children contains many references to family back-
ground and characteristics of parents and siblings); cf. Espadero v. Feld, 649 F. Supp. 1480, 1485 (D.
Colo. 1986) (citing Jones to support views that the difficulty of ascertaining damages should not
preclude a cause of action and that courts can fashion workable remedies in prenatal wrongful death
cases).
107. 257 N.C. 447, 126 S.E.2d 62 (1962).
108. Id. at 452, 126 S.E.2d at 66 (quoting 15 AM. JUR. Damages § 72 (1938)). The court contin-
ued, "'The amount allowed must be fair and reasonable, free from sentimental or fanciful standards,
and based upon the facts disclosed. In making the estimate the jury may consider the nature and
extent of the injuries and suffering occasioned by them and the duration thereof.'" Id. at 452, 126
S.E.2d at 66-67 (quoting 15 AM. JUR. Damages § 72 (1938)).
109. Brown v. Moore, 286 N.C. 664, 673, 213 S.E.2d 342, 349 (1975); In Bowen v. Constructors
Equip. Rental Co., 283 N.C. 395, 419-20, 196 S.E.2d 789, 805-06 (1973), the court stated:
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In overruling Cardwell and Yow "10 and bringing a viable fetus within the
protection of this state's Wrongful Death Act, the North Carolina Supreme
Court recognized that the life of a fetus killed by the negligent acts of another is
just as intrinsically valuable as any other human life. The court's holding that
this value should be reflected in an award of monetary damages to the fetus'
estate was an overdue progressive step necessary to assure North Carolina par-
ents that they will be compensated for the loss of their child. But while the
court stated in effect that a viable fetus has some inherent worth, the remedy the
court afforded the fetus' estaie limited this thesis by circumscribing the normal
damages awarded in wrongful death cases and thereby denied the full extent of
the fetus' worth in financial terms. The court accomplished this limitation by
holding without exception that damages for the wrongful death of a viable fetus
cannot include compensation for lost income, lost services and assistance, or lost
society and companionship. 11'
The limitation on damages is at the same time both consistent and inconsis-
tent with prior North Carolina case law. It is consistent with the reasoning used
in Gay v. Thompson 112 to deny a cause of action for prenatal wrongful death
entirely-that awarding any damages for intangible elements of loss would
amount to "sheer speculation."' 13 This line of thought is based on the well-
settled rule that damages in a tort action are meant to compensate the plaintiff
for the injury that has occurred and not to punish the tortfeasor. 114 While dam-
ages certainly should not be awarded in a wrongful death action merely to serve
a retributive purpose, Gay was decided in 1966, before the 1969 amendments to
the Wrongful Death Act abrogated the pecuniary loss rule and expanded the
damages recoverable in a wrongful death action to include compensation for the
loss of some elements that are speculative by their very nature." 15
Now that a broader range of damages is recoverable in wrongful death ac-
tions, an estate's ability to recover is no longer dependent solely on whether it
can produce mathematical calculations to support its claims of lost future in-
come.1 16 Indeed, the majority of the current elements of a decedent's monetary
value, such as lost services and lost companionship, cannot be proved to a math-
ematical certainty in any wrongful death case. Speculation will be necessary to
Since the persons entitled to the damages recovered may have suffered substantial losses on
account of these items of damage [in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-l8-2(b)(4)], we cannot say
there can be no recovery for these items of damages because no yardstick for ascertaining
the amount thereof has been provided. Damages recoverable under paragraph (4) would
be as capable of exact ascertainment as damages for pain and suffering and mental anguish
in a personal injury action.
110. See Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215
S.E.2d 623 (1975); Yow v. Nance, 29 N.C. App. 419, 224 S.E.2d 292, disc. rev. denied, 290 N.C. 312,
225 S.E.2d 833 (1976). For a discussion of the holdings in Cardwell and Yow, see supra text accom-
panying notes 59-62.
111. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 431-32, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
112. 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
113. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494; Gay, 266 N.C. at 400, 146 S.E.2d at 429.
114. See Gay, 266 N.C. at 400, 146 S.E.2d at 430; Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 311, 204 A.2d
140, 145 (1964).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26, 53-57.
116. See Brown v. Moore, 286 N.C. 664, 673, 213 S.E.2d 342, 348 (1975).
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arrive at any verdict, and the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that some
speculation in the calculation of damages cannot preclude recovery
altogether. 117
But it is on the issue of whether damages can be awarded in a prenatal
wrongful death case for any elements of damages having a speculative basis that
DiDonato is inconsistent with past case law. While calculating the monetary
value of a viable fetus is made somewhat more speculative than comparable cal-
culations because the fetus has never been born alive and its personal character-
istics can never be known, a jury is forced to engage in similar speculation to
arrive at an award for lost services and companionship in a loss of consortium
action, or for pain and suffering in any negligence action in which it is
awarded.118 Arguably, in a loss of consortium action a jury can look at the
quality of the affected parties' past life together in arriving at an award of dam-
ages, but concepts such as "services" and "companionship" are by their very
nature vague and difficult to translate into precise pecuniary terms. They would
seem to be equally speculative regardless of the age or status of the decedent.
For example, it is really no more speculative to attempt to assign a value to a
baby's companionship that expectant parents will never enjoy, than to the com-
panionship of an injured husband or wife. The North Carolina General Assem-
bly could have chosen to bar completely the recovery of damages for such
nebulous concepts on account of the speculation involved. Because the text of
the wrongful death statute reflects the rejection of such a prohibition,1 19 all par-
ties bringing wrongful death actions should have the same opportunity to receive
damages for loss of companionship, services, and the like. A jury certainly will
speculate to the same extent if the decedent in a wrongful death action is a one-
month-old baby, for whom the full complement of damages is currently avail-
able, or a viable fetus, for whom the the supreme court could envision no calcu-
lable monetary value.
The limitation on damages adopted by the supreme court in DiDonato re-
sults in a vastly inadequate award of damages to the estate of the child who had
a right to life, and to pursue a full life, only to have another's negligence bring an
abrupt and tragic end to his potential. Absent a showing of malice or willful and
wanton negligence, in which case punitive damages would be available, the es-
tate may recover only medical and funeral expenses, pain and suffering, and
nominal damages.120 The monetary value of a child certainly encompasses a
wider range of damages than that recognized in DiDonato, and undoubtedly in-
cludes more intangible qualities such as those enumerated in North Carolina
General Statutes section 28A-18-2(b)(4). The estate of a stillborn child should
have the opportunity to recover the entire complement of damages available to
other wrongful death plaintiffs.
117. See supra text accompanying note 95-98.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 101-109.
119. See supra note 24 and text accompanying notes 53-57.
120. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494. The court hinted that pain and suffering will
rarely be recoverable because of the difficulty in proving that a fetus can feel any trauma, but in light
of the constant advancement of medical technology the court refused to foreclose the possibility. Id.
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Because of this unreasonably restrictive recovery the North Carolina
Supreme Court should have looked at the manner in which other jurisdictions
tread the fine line between awarding adequate compensatory damages and en-
gaging in sheer speculation. 12 1 Like the Supreme Court of Illinois in Jones v.
Karraker,122 North Carolina's courts could relieve plaintiffs of the necessity of
proving a decedent's present monetary value by establishing a presumption of
pecuniary loss in viable fetus cases and a corresponding dollar amount for dam-
ages. 123 If the courts made this presumption rebuttable, plaintiffs would be au-
tomatically entitled to an adequate recovery unless the defendant could show
some circumstances under which plaintiff deserved a lesser judgment.1 24 In the
alternative, the North Carolina General Assembly could establish a statutory
minimum recovery similar to the one formerly employed in West Virginia 125 or
a specified statutory sum to be awarded all estates successfully bringing wrong-
ful death actions because of the death of viable fetuses.
Another approach the North Carolina Supreme Court could have followed
is the expansion of the use of expert witnesses in ascertaining the present mone-
tary value of a decedent. North Carolina courts frequently allow use of econo-
mists, provided of course that counsel first qualifies the economists as expert
witnesses and that the economists carefully explain the basis of their calcula-
tions.126 In a stillborn fetus case, several bases for calculating the present mone-
tary value of a viable fetus exist adapted to reflect the loss from the estate's
perspective rather than that of the parents of the deceased child.
A case from Michigan suggests an alternative measure of the value of a
child can be calculated using an investment theory. 12 7 In Wycko v. Gnodtke 128
the Michigan Supreme Court held that in measuring the pecuniary value of a
deceased fourteen-year-old, a jury should consider expenditures incurred by his
parents in his upbringing in arriving at an appropriate measure of his monetary
value.129 While at first glance this theory may seem reasonable, it is theoretically
121. See supra text accompanying notes 68-92.
122. 98 Ill. 2d 487, 489-91, 457 N.E.2d 23, 24-25 (1983).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70. Guidance in establishing a presumption could
also be gleaned from Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970), a Kentucky case holding that award-
ing damages to the estate of a viable fetus should operate under the inference that the child would
have possessed some earning power. Id. at 735.
124. Such circumstances include a showing by defendant that the fetus had a congenital defect
or major prenatal illness prior to any negligent act by defendant.
125. See Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220, 226-27 (S.D. W. Va. 1969).
126. See, eg., Powell v. Parker, 62 N.C. App. 465, 303 S.E.2d 225 (permitting an economist to
testify as to decedent's present monetary value provided the economist disclosed considerations used
in arriving at value), disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 322, 307 S.E.2d 166 (1983); Thorpe v. Wilson, 58
N.C. App. 292, 293 S.E.2d 675 (1982) (allowing an economist to testify about decedent's future net
income and present monetary value of her household services).
127. Under the investment theory, expenses of birth, food, clothing, instruction, nurture, and
shelter are considered to constitute a child's value. See Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105
N.W.2d 118 (1960). Contra Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686 (1973) (holding
as inappropriate the investment theory for measuring a child's value); Estate of Powers v. City of
Troy, 380 Mich. 160, 156 N.W.2d 530 (1968) (Brennan, J., concurring) (criticizing the Wycko hold-
ing for attempting to equate the loss of a human life with a specific pecuniary value).
128. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
129. Id. at 339-40, 105 N.W.2d at 122-23. The court stated, "Just as with respect to a manufac-
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unsound as applied to North Carolina law because it fails to take into account
the important legal distinction between the parents as an entity and the estate
itself. In a wrongful death action brought by the administrator of a stillborn
child's estate, it is the estate and not the parents as individuals that seeks to
recover damages for the loss of the child. It cannot be denied that in the major-
ity of prenatal wrongful death cases the child's parents and the beneficiaries of
its estate will be one and the same. But the parents of a stillborn child have
other legal remedies available to them in seeking damages for injuries arising
from the same negligent behavior that resulted in their child's death.1 30 Any
damages awarded pursuant to North Carolina's Wrongful Death Act go to the
estate to be distributed accordingly.131 It is a slippery, yet significant,
distinction.
A commentator also has advocated basing the measure of economic loss in
child wrongful death cases on a similar investment theory and has proposed
several variations that attempt to place an appropriate value on a child's life. 132
These proposals are theoretically sound under the law of Colorado, the com-
mentator's jurisdiction, because parents of minors are authorized by statute to
bring wrongful death actions in that state. 133 But as applied to North Carolina
law, which requires the personal representative of the deceased to bring any
wrongful death action, 134 these investment theories are inappropriate. On one
turing plant, or industrial machine, value involves the costs of acquisition emplacement, upkeep,
maintenance service, repair, and, renovation, so, in our context, we must consider the expenses of
birth, of food, of clothing, of medicines, of instruction, of nurture and shelter." Id. at 339, 105
N.W.2d at 122. The Court also held that companionship and mutual society give value to a life and
should be considered in arriving at an award of damages. Id. at 339-40, 105 N.W.2d at 122-23.
130. The parents' ability to bring personal injury actions distinct from the estate's wrongful
death action could result in two awards of damages for the same injury. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 432,
358 S.E.2d at 494. The majority in DiDonato would require joinder of the parent's suits with the
wrongful death action to avoid this overlap. Id. at 434, 358 S.E.2d at 495.
While the parents may bring actions for their own personal injuries resulting from the same
negligent behavior that killed their unborn child, their chances of recovering damages for the emo-
tional distress that doubtless accompanied their child's death are far from certain. As the North
Carolina Supreme Court stated previously, "[I]t appears to be well settled in North Carolina that
recovery in civil cases may be had where coincident in time and place with the act producing the
mental stress some actual physical impact or genuine physical injury also results from defendant's
wrongful act." State v. Boone, 307 N.C. 198, 204, 297 S.E.2d 585, 589 (1982).
In a case arising in a context similar to DiDonato, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held
that a woman who gave birth to a single child after being misdiagnosed by physicians as carrying
twins could not state a claim for emotional distress. Woodell v. Pinehurst Surgical Clinic, P.A., 78
N.C. App. 230, 232-33, 336 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1985), affirmed, 316 N.C. 550, 342 S.E.2d 523 (1986).
The court held that "the hurt, emotional upset and embarrassment suffered by plaintiff upon her
healthy delivery after the negligently-arrived-at misdiagnosis of twins, is not a sufficient basis for
recovery when there is no evidence of physical injury." Id. While the North Carolina Court of
Appeals recently held in Ledford v. Martin, 87 N.C. App. 88, 92, 359 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1987), that
birth by cesarean section is "physical injury" so as to allow the mother to successfully bring a sepa-
rate cause of action, every viable fetus wrongful death case need not involve a cesarean birth. Unless
parents of a stillborn child can demonstrate actual physical injury in those cases without a cesarean
birth so as to receive substantial damages for emotional distress, the damages they recover will not
come close to compensating them for the loss of their child.
131. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(a) (1984).
132. See Pacey, Measures of Economic Loss in the Wrongful Death of a Child, 14 COLO. LAW.
392 (1985).
133. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-201 (1)(c) (1973).
134. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28A-18-2(a), 28A-18-3 (1984).
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hand, an economist may ascertain a child's value by calculating the return on
the parents' investment if money spent in raising a child had been invested in a
non-human asset, such as real estate or the stock market. 135 In the alternative,
one may assume that the benefits derived from raising a child are equal to or
greater than the costs, thereby entitling parents to at least the current average
cost of raising a child to the age of majority as their damages. 136
Each of these methods, however, focuses on the investment made by par-
ents in attempting to calculate a wrongful death recovery for the parents. As
applied to North Carolina law, theproposals overlook the fact that any wrong-
ful death recovery will be distributed by the estate of the stillborn, with the
parents receiving damages only indirectly through the estate. Given the estate's
status as plaintiff in a wrongful death action, it is theoretically improper to base
the award to the estate on the parents' investment in the child. The investment
theory, however, is not entirely without merit. A testifying economist might
present statistics on the average costs incurred by all sources of a child's finan-
cial support in raising the child, a total investment in the child so to speak, and
argue that the figure approximates the inherent value of a child. Further varia-
tions on these investment-based theories of recovery will be left to the econo-
mists. While it is true that treating a child as an investment assumes that all
investments will be profitable and thus relies on a connection to reality that may
in fact be nonexistent, these solutions to the damages problem employ solid eco-
nomic analysis to calculate a recovery that is far less speculative than the recov-
ery resulting when a jury is given no guidance at all in making its decision.
Rough justice and justice according to simple gut feeling seem to be dirty
words in most of our courtrooms, words shrewd lawyers look on with disdain.
And while what "seems fair" certainly should not be the sole guiding principle
behind the American system of justice, the influence of the concept of fairness is
readily evident in the role equity courts and equitable considerations have
played in our legal history up to the present day. Keeping justice and fairness in
mind, it is certain that no amount of money can ever compensate a person for
the loss of a life. But by establishing a cause of action for wrongful death of a
viable fetus in DiDonato v. Wortman, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
allowed juries for the first time to ascertain the value of an unborn child's life, at
least in part. The court's desire to prevent "sheer speculation" and emotional-
ism from inflating recoveries by the child's estate, however, has resulted in an
unnecessarily conservative and cautious approach to the damages issue.
135. Pacey, supra note 131, at 401-02. Using 1985 figures and assuming that $4850 is the yearly
average expenditure on a child and that 8.5% is a reasonable rate of return, the parents' "alternative
investment" would have yielded $206,900 in eighteen years. Id. at 402.
136. Pacey, supra note 131, at 401. Dr. Pacey compares this approach with "shadow pricing"
done by the U.S. government in calculating the value of social programs. For example, benefits
gained from disease control or crime control programs must be equal to the moneys spent for these
programs if the programs are to be fiscally desirable. Id. Other methods of placing a pecuniary
value on children suggested by Dr. Pacey include awarding parents a set number of dollars per hour
based on the average number of hours per week a child would devote to parental assistance and
support and awarding parents a set percentage of a grown child's future earnings that would have
likely been spent on parental service and aid. Id. at 400, 402.
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Of course, juries should not be given the freedom to compensate grieving
parents as beneficiaries beyond what they deserve, unconstrained by any limita-
tions on the size of the judgment. On the other hand, the estate should be
awarded a sum bearing some relation to the magnitude of the loss. Commenta-
tors have proposed and other jurisdictions have devised equitable and workable
solutions to the damages problem, ranging from a presumption of substantial
pecuniary loss, to a statutory minimum recovery in stillborn child wrongful
death cases, to an economic analysis of the monetary value of a child's life. Not
all of these solutions work equally well or have equally sound theoretical bases,
but simple fairness dictates that North Carolina's courts and General Assembly
should look at the methods employed by other jurisdictions to solve the difficult
damages issue. In combination with one of these methods, juries should be
given wide latitude to award damages as they deem appropriate, subject to the
trial judge's power to overturn any verdict that is excessive on its face. This
state should not compound the tragedy of aperson's wrongful death by prevent-
ing adequate legal redress.
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